CVE-2026-53604
Severity not reportednebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN.
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
Affected products
Not reported by the source (unknown — not "none").
Weakness classification (CWE)
Source: NVD / CISA. “NVD-CWE-Other” and “NVD-CWE-noinfo” mean NVD could not assign a specific weakness.
Mitigation & advisories
No vendor advisory or patch reference tagged by NVD. Check the references below.
References
- https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/1f1ab9aa8472239763d967e3d50a3cd53a1a79b9 security-advisories@github.com
- https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.8 security-advisories@github.com
- https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5 security-advisories@github.com
