CVE-2026-62162
Severity not reportedHydra is a layer-two scalability solution for Cardano.
Hydra is a layer-two scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to 2.1.0, the `Claim` branch in `hydra-plutus/validators/deposit.ak` checks only that `datum.head_id` matches the attacker-controlled `redeemer.currencySymbol` and that the transaction is valid before the deposit deadline. It neither requires spending the Head state-token UTxO in the same transaction nor constrains outputs. After a deposit made through `POST /commit` is confirmed, any third party able to build a Cardano transaction can observe and consume the pending deposit UTxO before its deadline and redirect the assets to an arbitrary address. A standalone deposit spend invokes no Head validator, bypassing its safety checks; historical head-ID binding and the Aiken rewrite retained this missing invariant. The default deadline is three times depositPeriod, so the described attack applies to pending deposits before that deadline. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.0.
Affected products
Not reported by the source (unknown — not "none").
Weakness classification (CWE)
Source: NVD / CISA. “NVD-CWE-Other” and “NVD-CWE-noinfo” mean NVD could not assign a specific weakness.
Mitigation & advisories
No vendor advisory or patch reference tagged by NVD. Check the references below.
References
- https://github.com/cardano-scaling/hydra/commit/ff60e4af4ecf05545a696a6d9bf1afeffe991de0 security-advisories@github.com
- https://github.com/cardano-scaling/hydra/releases/tag/2.1.0 security-advisories@github.com
- https://github.com/cardano-scaling/hydra/security/advisories/GHSA-gfpc-m687-p7h5 security-advisories@github.com
