CVE-2026-80829

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output() snd_usbmidi_novation_outp…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output() snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &transfer_buffer[2] together with a length of ep->max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit(): count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream, &transfer_buffer[2], ep->max_transfer - 2); ep->max_transfer comes from the output endpoint's wMaxPacketSize via usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this value downwards - so ep->max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument becomes -1. snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where "if (count1 > count) count1 = count" leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep->max_transfer). This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output() in commit 0970274613fb ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()"); the novation output routine was left unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header plus at least one payload byte.