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CVE-2026-93185

Severity not reported
Data quality: partial. Some fields were not provided by the source.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove rt700_sdw_remove() drains jack_detect_w…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove rt700_sdw_remove() drains jack_detect_work and jack_btn_check_work only when rt700->hw_init is true. That state bit is cleared by rt700_update_status() when the SoundWire slave becomes UNATTACHED, but a jack work item can already have been queued by rt700_interrupt_callback() or rt700_jack_init() while the device was initialized. Do not use hw_init as the remove-time guard for draining these work objects. The delayed works are initialized during rt700_init(), so remove can cancel them unconditionally and pair the object lifetime with the codec-private data lifetime instead of a mutable hardware state bit. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by manual review of the SoundWire status, interrupt and remove paths. The remove path should drain work based on whether the work object exists, not on a runtime hardware state bit that can change after the work was queued. A QEMU PoC queued jack_detect_work, simulated SDW_SLAVE_UNATTACHED, and then entered remove. DEBUG_OBJECTS reported an active timer/work object associated with the rt700 jack work path after remove skipped the cancel. This is sent as an RFC because the practical trigger depends on SoundWire core remove ordering after an UNATTACHED status update. If remove cannot run after hw_init has been cleared while jack work is still pending, this is a defensive lifecycle cleanup rather than a reachable race on current systems.

CVSS
—
Awaiting analysis by NVD
Timeline (UTC)
Published: 2026-09-17 17:18
Modified: 2026-10-19 10:17
NVD status: Received
Last synced 2 days ago
Verified against the source API 2026-10-27 06:54 UTC
Exploitation
Not listed in CISA KEV (as of last catalog sync)
Absence from KEV does not mean a CVE is not exploited. Exploitation status: unknown (no authoritative evidence in our sources).

Affected products

Not reported by the source (unknown — not "none").

Mitigation & advisories

No vendor advisory or patch reference tagged by NVD. Check the references below.

References

Data sources

NVD CVE API 2.0 — fetched 2026-10-27 06:54 UTC · record ↗

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